If Lula loses, BRICS could face its biggest political test yet

Oct 10, 2026 at 10:28 AM

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Lanka Leader

Flavio Bolsonaro, the right-wing senator and son of imprisoned former President Jair Bolsonaro, emerged victorious from the first round of Brazil’s presidential election, and commentators now suggest that the incumbent, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, may struggle to catch him in the second round.

If they’re correct, Brazil will become the latest country to join Latin America’s shift to the right.

The Brazilian story, adapted to local circumstances, bears a striking resemblance to the American experience with Donald Trump. After the turbulent presidency of Bolsonaro senior, a representative of the moderate left returned to power, while attempts were made to remove the former president from political life for good.

In the United States, Trump was fiercely condemned as the instigator of an attempted coup, although criminal proceedings against him ultimately failed to prevent his return to power. In Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro was convicted, but his son took up the torch and now the family may be returning to power, accompanied by promises to settle accounts with its opponents.

Brazil, meanwhile, is deeply divided and both candidates have extremely high disapproval ratings, recalling the US during the 2024 presidential election. For Lula, age is an additional problem because however vigorously he tries to present himself, the fact remains that he is 80, and he lacks Trump’s particular brand of political brutality.

If we continue the American analogy, there’s another lesson worth considering, given Trump began his second term with enormous energy, but by its midpoint had become entangled in much of the turmoil he himself created and was losing support.

Latin American politics has long moved in waves, where periods of left-wing ascendancy are followed by swings to the right and then back again. At present, the right is advancing.

Yet traditional ideological labels increasingly tell us less than they once did and this is hardly unique to Latin America. Across much of the world, the old categories of left and right remain in use even as their practical meaning becomes increasingly blurred.

The domestic implications of Brazil’s election are best left to specialists on the country, but its international consequences are already easier to discern and most importantly, a political shift in Brazil would reverberate throughout BRICS.

There’s already no shortage of internal tension within the grouping; one need only consider the difficult relationship between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Now the country represented by the first letter of the BRICS acronym, and one for which membership has traditionally been an important source of international status and prestige, could move towards political forces openly skeptical of the project itself.

Jair Bolsonaro didn’t withdraw Brazil from BRICS during his presidency, but he reduced his country’s involvement to a minimum and he subsequently said he regretted not leaving the organization altogether.

His Argentine ally Javier Milei went further; after becoming president at the end of 2023, he rejected Argentina’s planned accession to BRICS, despite Buenos Aires having already received an invitation to join.

Should Lula lose, Brazil is likely to adopt a strongly pro-American, Trump-style orientation, at least for the immediate future.

Trump’s hostility towards BRICS is well know and he regards it, not entirely without reason, as a prototype of a world in which the US no longer enjoys the international predominance to which it became accustomed after the Cold War.

That doesn’t necessarily mean Brazil would formally leave BRICS, given much would depend on the degree of pressure exerted by Washington and on the calculations of a new Brazilian government, but a freezing or significant downgrading of Brazil’s participation would become quite conceivable. None of this means Latin America’s present shift to the right is permanent as another reversal will inevitably come.

Indeed, the willingness of voters to move repeatedly from one political camp to another suggests something more fundamental, that neither side has been able to provide lasting answers to the economic and social problems that concern the public.

But these domestic changes are taking place against a much larger international transformation.

The global environment is in flux as old institutions and assumptions are losing their authority, while their replacements are either still emerging or do not yet exist and political generations are also changing.

The generation currently governing many of the world’s major powers leaves a particularly strong personal imprint on international affairs and more importantly, these leaders were shaped by the aftermath of the 20th century, whose political inheritance is now steadily fading.

That doesn’t mean the underlying redistribution of global power will stop. The West will not recover the position it once enjoyed, not least because the West itself is becoming less monolithic whereas the Global East is exercising increasing influence over international affairs, while the Global South is becoming one of the principal arenas in which the emerging order will be determined.

BRICS belongs to this changing world as a relatively new community whose development reflects the broader movement towards a more diverse international system.

But history rarely proceeds in straight lines, and the underlying trend may continue even as individual institutions change direction, stagnate, or assume forms very different from those originally expected. Yesterday’s expectations of BRICS need not resemble tomorrow’s reality.

Brazil may soon provide an important test and equally significant will be the evolution of Washington’s increasingly explicit ambition to reassert American predominance throughout the Western Hemisphere. How that policy develops will tell us much about the future importance of the world’s major regions.

For Russia, however, the principal task lies closer to home and, as President Vladimir Putin again argued in his recent Valdai speech, Moscow’s priority must be Eurasia.

That is where Russia’s greatest efforts should be concentrated as the center of gravity is here, while everything beyond it will develop as circumstances permit.

Fyodor Lukyanov is one of the most prominent Russian experts in the field of international relations and foreign policy. He has worked in journalism since 1990 and is the author of numerous publications on modern international relations and Russian foreign policy.

Since 2002, he has been the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs – a magazine conceived as a platform for dialogue and debate among foreign and Russian experts and policymakers.

In 2012, he was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy of Russia, one of the oldest Russian NGOs. Since 2015, he has been the Director for Scientific Work of the Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai International Discussion Club.

He works as a research professor at the Faculty of World Economy and Global Politics at the National Research University Higher School of Economics.